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ANTIGm, ECCM and CAEICOM 
The ProblfâD. 
Thei-e is an apparent difficulty faced by ECCM member states 
because of the reluctance of Antigiaa to accede to the Caribbean 
Community Treaty» The central problem derives from their individual 
and collective obligations vis-a-vis Antigua, after their accession 
to the Caribbean Community Treaty^ In order to examine this problemj 
it is necessary to recall briefly the background to the creation of 
the ECCM. 
Background 
2o Antigua was one of the founding members of the original 
Dickenson Bay Agreement establishing a Free Trade Area between 
Antiguaj Barbados and Guyana in December 1965» Although the 
Agreement never became operational, it stimulated discussion 
between all fomer members of the Federation to re=appraise their 
futtire relationships within the Caribbean, particularly regarding 
the need for a new strategy for co-operation.s The Dickenson Bay 
doctanent provided common groimd, since its strategy of economic, 
as opposed to political, co-operation found wider acceptance» A 
significant new element in these discussions was the decision by 
Guyana to participate fully in any co-operative movenent based on 
economic integration» The Dickenson Bay docxmient was therefore 
used as th® basic instrmnent for negotiating free trade arrange-
ments within the wider Commonwealth Caribbean® 
3« By May 1968j the negotiations had reached the stage where it 
was evident that there would be an effective Free Trade Area 
embracing all Commonwealth Caribbean countries; this was regarded 
as the first step in the process of economic integration^ During 
these negotiations, some of the Associated States became concerned 
about their inferior bargaining position vis-a-vis the larger 
statesj and sought an instrument which would improve their ability 
to negotiate on more equal terms. Subsequently, out of discussions 
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in the WISA. Council of Ministersj the idea was born that a Gommon 
Market comprising the seven smaller states would be fomed. 
Conceptually, the objective was to create a cohesive economic unit 
among those states which would constitute an effective fifth 
negotiating entity within CARIFTA., in contrast with the "Big Four"® 
However, this implied that these states would take constructive 
and espeditious action in economic co-operation so that they 
would be always one step ahead of other CAEIPTA countries in the 
integration process» It may be observed here that although the 
preamble to the Common Market Agreement makes reference to CAEITIA, 
there is no other reference to that Association in the ECCM Agreement» 
4e Th© ECCM Agreement cam® into fore® ©n 1 July 1968 with a 
membership comprising the seven smaller states^ and after this, 
all its members acceded to CARIFTAe Th® Agreement itself was 
deliberately written, as a simple instrument containing the basic 
necessities of a Common Market Agreement! howeverj it provided all 
the main elenents for the creation of an effective institution» 
What was required was initiative in activating the main economic 
clauses, apart from those dealing with trade liberalizations For 
a variety of reasons^ no significant progress has been made in 
promoting co-operation in major areas outlined in the Agreement, 
except for the creation of a Common Customs Tariff. In the meantime, 
spurred by the desire to derive further benefits from economic 
integration, some coxintries at the CARIPTA level pressed for greater 
sectoral co-operation and creation of ancillary instrimients as an 
aid to CARIFTA, thereby "deepening" the integration process» 
Considerable progress was therefore made in converting the Free 
Trade area into a closer form of economic integration» The result 
was the creation of a Caribbean Community Treaty, -ith the Common 
Ma-rk©t Annex as its main economic instrisnent» So far, all CARIPTA, 
mmberSj, except Antigua^ have acceded, or have indicated their 
intention to accede to the Treaty» 
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Th® ECCM Agrsement and Caribbean Conmiimity Treaty 
5s As noted before^ the ECCM Agreement is a very simple instrument, 
but compares favourably in content with the Common Market Annex of 
the Community Treaty^ The Annex, however, contains some principles 
which are not specifically included in the ECCM Agreement» These 
are as followss 
CARICOM's objective is a Common Protective Policy, 
which includes a Common External Tariff and a 
harmonised approach to quantitative and other 
restrictions o The ECCM Agreement makes provision 
for a Common External Tariff and "common commercial 
policies" to third countrieso 
1 1 , CARICOM makes special provisions for Establishment, 
Services and Movanent of Capital^ The ECCM Agrement 
makes no provision» 
iiio CARICOM also envisages (a) the form.ulation of a 
series of Double Taxation Agreements 5 (b) the 
desirability of Harmonization of LawS| (c) a common 
approach to Ownership and Control of Eegional Resources: 
and creates (d) a Special Regime for LDCs^ 
Essentially, however, there is no major fundamental difference between 
the Annex and the ECCM Agreement, But the Community Treaty does 
contemplate co-operation outside strictly economic areas: viz, 
(a) co-ordination of foreign policiesf 
(b) functional co-operation in certain common services; 
(c) promotion of social, cultural, and technological 
developnent s 
In this regard, it may be noted that the relevant clauses are very 
flexible^ and may even be described as "discretionary",, 
The Future of CARIPTA and ECCM 
6,, All members of CARIPTA, except Antigua, have already given 
notice of their intention to withdraw from that Association under 
Artiel© 33 of the Agreements This means that on the expiration of 
the twelve-month period^ there will be one CARIFIA member, ioe^ 
Antigua» Therefore in practical terms, there will be no CAHIFTA. 
The ECCM Agreement, howeverj stands on its own and survives even if 
CARIFTA is dissolved® So far, there is no indication that present 
members of this Agreement intend to terminate it, and neither has 
Antigua decided to withdraw» Consequently, present ECCM members 
(excluding Antigua) will have a common market relationship with 
(a) all other ex-CARITTA countries on the one hand, 
i<,eo under CARICOM5 and 
(b) with Antigua on the other hand, i.e® under ECCM. 
7o In theoretical terms, it is possible to observe and maintain 
these respective rights and obligations in a tidy and satisfactory 
mannei-o In practices, however, there will be numerous administrative 
difficulties, not the least of which will be the role of the ECCM 
Secretariat. The nature of some of these difficulties could be 
examined in the context of the progress made in activating the 
provisions of the ECCM Agreements 
8e As noted above, the only area in which substantial progress 
has been made beyond that of trade liberalization, is the establish-
ment of a Common External Tariff® What is significant, however, is 
that Antigua has so far not implanented this tariff. In effect, 
therefore, only a free trade arrangement exists between ECCM members 
who have implemented this tariff and those who have not; the latter 
group includes Antigua^ The present position would therefore seem 
to indicate that this free trade relationship is the only obligation 
which LDC's who become members of CARICOM would have vis-a-vis 
Antigua, 
Institutions 
9o These would present some minor difficulties, Antigua is a 
member of the WISA Council of Ministers, and the ECCM Council of 
Ministers. If on® accepts the reasoning that both these forums will 
be used as clearing ground for formulation of common approaches to 
negotations with other CARICOM members, then it is conceivable that 
Antigua's contribution to deliberations would be either negative or 
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disruptive. A situation can therefore be envisaged where there is 
continual bickering within these institutions^ with no progress made. 
Moreover, the fact that the ECCM Secretariat is now located in 
Antigua would create serious problems. This institution would 
functionally be serving six member states of CAEICOM, and one 
non-member state \rfio is its host. ECCA arrangements present little 
difficultyj escept where decisions are taken to harmonise monetary-
policies within the broader CAEICOM requirements» 
10® Similar difficulties may be encountered in some Associate 
Institutions of the Caribbean Community in which Antigua participates: 
<Bogof Regional Shipping Council, Caribbean Meteorological Councilj 
the Council of Legal Educatiouc In the case of the Caribbean 
Developnent Bank, a minor problm is also likely to arise, since 
Antigua enjoys joint representation along with the other Leewards 
on the Board of DirectorSo On the international scene, Antigua is 
a constituent of the single Associate manber within the ECIA. 
Antigua's Economy and its Approach to CAEICOM 
11, In many respectsj Antigua has been one of the strongest 
protagonists of economic integration in the Caribbean^ The current 
Groverrmient however seems to be less of an advocate than its 
predecessor, and it is therefore necessary to ascertain whether 
there are any technical reasons for this change of «aphasis. 
12» During negotiations in respect of both CAEIFTA and the ECCM, 
the previous regime generally endeavoured to preserve an open 
economy, on the grounds of its need for imported inputs into tourism 
and its smuggling problems^ This was possibly due to the coimtry's 
economic evolution from basically agricultural to a tourist-oriented 
economys At present tourism is the prime mover in the economy, and 
this has stimulated construction, and some of the services sectors, 
including Government« Agriculture has declined with the virtual 
disappearance of both sugar and cotton, and these export staples 
have not been replaced by any significant growth in the domestic 
agriculture sector® In industry, apart from some small plants 
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geared to satisfy simple domestic needs, the major sub-sector is 
petroleum refiningj based wholly on imported crudco The refinery, 
which now has an estimated capacity of about 18,000 b.do, enjoys 
extrmely generous fiscal and other incentives® 
13, Basically, therefore^ agriculture has been replaced by Tourism, 
Construction and petroleum, all of which depend heavily on imported 
inputs, thus necessitating the preservation of a significant degree 
of "openness" in the economy. If this basic economic structure, 
which has been evident for the past decade, is deaned to be 
satisfactory, it is in the interest of Antigxia to opt out of any 
common market arranganents. It may be noted here^ somewhat 
paradoxically^ that Antigua initiated study into the creation of 
the ECCM, and this may be construed as an indication that the state, 
under the previous administrationj^ desired to change its strategy 
of developments In any case, from a technical viewpoint, it seems 
difficult to accept the present strategy based on imported inputs 
and the preservation of an open economye 
14. But even accepting this strategy, it is possible to acconmiodate 
it within the present framework of the Caribbean. Community Treaty» 
The Annex makes provision for special arrangements by individual 
states for a specific industry, in this case petroleum, and recognises 
the important role of Tourism in development of Caribbean states» 
In any case the phasing-in period for the CARICOM Common Tariff and 
common protective policy, along with the provisions of Article 55, 
would provide Antigua with the necessary adjustment period, 
provided the state's longer term objective is to procvire increasing 
ratios of its inputs to the tourist industry from domestic and 
regional sources. And this, in essence, is one of the prime 
objectives of economic integration, 
15a There has also been a fear expressed that im^plmentation of 
CAEICOM's common tariff would have an adverse revenue impact in 
Antigma, This seens groundless in view of the low overall incidence 
of Antigua's tariff in relation to the proposed CARICOM tariff. 
On the contraryj revenues would be increased^ possibly with em 
upward price effect in the internal economy. This latter factor 
represents the real threat, but it may be observed that prices 
have been increasing sharply in CARIFTA. countrieSj even before a 
Common External Tariff was introduced» In other words CARIFTA./ 
CARICOM countries have been absorbing price increases generated 
by the international community without any compensatory benefits» 
IGs Antigua is probably also concerned at the real possibility 
that moiibership in CAHICOM would necessitate substituting "high-
priced" intra-CAEICOM imports for "low-cost" extra-regional importSa 
In the present international context one may validly challenge this 
assertions but it must be recognised that there are cogent arguments 
on both sides of the question» The problen resolves itself into 
on® of the balance of benefitSa The major objective of economic 
integration in a region with the historical background and resource 
base of the CaribbeaUj must be to make short-term "sacrifices" 
f o r longer term b e n e f i t S s But the main integration instrument 
recognises this and makes provision for cushioning such short-
term adverse impacts as may be envisaged by Antigua. 
17o On technical groundSj there seems to be no over=riding reasons 
for Antigua opting out of CARICOM. Even the short-term "balance 
of benefits" problem can be satisfactorily resolved^ provided the 
state wishes to preserve its present dependence on Tourism and 
Petroleum refining» Of course, in the longer rim, its economy 
must undergo some transformation^ otherwise, there is no need 
for economic integratione The reasons would therefore appear 
to b® politically motivated;, and this aspect cannot be examined 
